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Abstract
This paper is the outcome of a month-long exploratory study on whether
consociationalism has a moderating influence on politics in Northern Ireland. I analyzed
the impact of consociationalism on policymaking, party platforms and voter choice to
determine if it strengthens and enlarges the middle ground or bifurcates the political
community into two extreme and conflicting political agendas. Data was obtained
through a literature study and eight interviews with academics as well as political
representatives and advisors. This research tested two competing theories of
consociationalism: David Horowitz’s theory of consociationalism as a centrifugal force
and John McGarry’s and Brendand O’Leary’s theory that consociationalism encourages
cooperation and unifying politics. It is concluded that consociationalism has had a
dramatic moderating influence on policies and political platforms, but voter choice is still
controlled by ethnic allegiances. The disconnect between voter choice and actual
governance within Stormont allows parties to grandstand on loose, undefined and shifting
platforms which stifles the democratic process. This paper recommends a shift in
electoral systems or minor changes to the current consociational structure.
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Introduction
Prior to my research, I spent two and half months in Ireland studying the history
and politics of the island. I heard the stories of former prisoners and members of
paramilitary organizations, of the sympathizers and the apathetic, and of victims1 whose
worlds were destroyed as they lost friends and family in the conflict. I found many stories
disturbing; some men proudly described a victory against the enemy, involving the clever
placement of a bomb or the gunning down of men loading their weapons. At other times,
I felt the remaining tension of the conflict in the uncomfortable awkward silence after a
student’s presumptive question or unknowingly insensitive remark. I felt the lasting pain
in the voice of a victim as she explained that the man who killed her father walks freely
in the halls of Stormont, the parliament building of her own government. If the stories
were not enough, the schools and harsh cement walls that divide catholic and protestant
communities should be sufficient evidence that Northern Ireland, despite the lack of
physical violence, is still a place of extreme political, ethnic and religious conflict. It is
hard to overcome 30 years of bloody conflict and the loss of over 3,000 lives.2
It was difficult to imagine effective political cooperation after witnessing the deep
divisions throughout the community. As a citizen of a country where there is constant
gridlock between two different political ideologies, I was baffled by the prospect of a
functional government that requires the cooperation of parties emerging from years of
violent conflict with one another. After further investigation into the Northern Ireland
democratic system, my curiosity grew. I wanted to understand the effect of the power1

The term victim is not intended to be mutually exclusive with the other groups
mentioned. The categorization of victims is complex and not a feat I will attempt in this
paper.
2
“On this Day: 1974: 'Troubles' death toll hits 1,000”. BBC.
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sharing arrangement on party politics and the democratic system at large. With a passion
for studying reconstruction and stabilization in post-conflict states, heightened by current
events like the Arab Springs, I wanted to investigate how Northern Ireland managed to
end most violence and have a functioning government. I set out to investigate the impact
of the power-sharing system on Northern Ireland, specifically to see whether it
encourages more moderate politics.
In the Belfast Agreement of 1998, political parties from both sides of the ethnic
divide agreed to a devolved system of government composed of the Northern Ireland
Assembly and a joint cross-community power-sharing executive. There was to be
mandatory cross-community voting on major issues and electoral representation in
accordance with the D’Hondt method, which is proportional representation by party-list. 3
This power-sharing structure and electoral system of proportional representation are key
components of consociationalism, a form of government often recommended for post
conflict states. The Belfast Agreement was not immediately effective due to pressures on
the IRA to decommission and the DUP’s anti-agreement stance. However, all key
stakeholders, including the DUP, reaffirmed the agreement in the 2007 St. Andrews
Agreement.4 The political context was finally ripe for a consociational system, planting
hope for political stability in Northern Ireland. Today, Northern Ireland is at a new
crossroad; with the economic downturn underway, the government is faced with
challenges beyond presenting a cooperative government. They must start making serious
policy decisions that will produce real and effective results. The symbolism of Martin

3
4

North Ireland Office, “The Agreement,” 7.
Northern Ireland Assembly, “The Agreement at St. Andrew’s.” Annex A, 2 (2007).
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McGinnis and Peter Robinson standing together made a difference, but now they must
prove they can be a functional government that serves the interests of their people.
This paper investigates whether consociationalism has a moderating influence on
politics in Northern Ireland. I will analyze the impact of consociationalism on
policymaking, party platforms and elections to determine if it strengthens and enlarges
the middle ground or bifurcates the political community into two extreme and conflicting
political agendas. First, I outline the methodology of my research, as well as a review of
the interview process and prominent topic literature. This includes a discussion of
resources, challenges and personal bias. Then, I set up the academic context and
introduce the theoretical frameworks that my main argument will engage. Subsequently, I
outline my argument. Horowitz’s theory of centrifugal force affects voter choice but not
actual policymaking or even party platforms beyond basic posturing. In fact,
consociationalism has had a dramatic moderating influence on politics within Stormont.
The disconnect between voter choice and actual governance within Stormont allows
parties to grandstand on loose, undefined and shifting platforms which stifles the
democratic process. Finally, I briefly discuss possible solutions including the Deborda
voting system advocated by Peter Emerson.

Methodology
To analyze the impact of consociationalism on politics in Northern Ireland, I
conducted eight interviews and researched secondary sources including scholarly articles,
online newspapers, magazines and books. I also attended one of my academic contacts’
graduate level lectures on consociationalism at Queens University that was followed by a
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small class discussion. Finally, I heard several lectures on the topic throughout the course
of my program that provided a background understanding and made the literature more
approachable. A combination of both academic literature and interviews of key players
enabled me to connect the ivory tower academic theory to what is actually happening on
the ground. It is useful to look at past cases, group psychology, and theoretical
explanations, but only by hearing from the people who work within the system and
confront these issues daily will research be applicable or helpful to policy decisions.
Like any individual conducting research, I entered the process with unfounded
assumptions about what I would discover. I had an initial strong negative reaction to the
consociational system, specifically it categorizing parties as nationalist or unionist. I felt
this would institutionalize ethnic divisions and create an antagonistic environment where
every political battle was unionists versus nationalists. I thought my research would find
that consociationalism supports more extreme parties and that that is why the SDLP and
UUP lost all of their power. My ultimate conclusion is drastically different and contrary
to my original assumption entering the research.

A Review of Sources
For interviews, I targeted academics with published work on consociationalism in
Northern Ireland, as well as political representatives and strategists from different
political parties. Several factors played a role in deciding which individuals to target for
interviews. The most influential factor in choosing a contact was whether I had a
connection to the individual that would increase the chances of their cooperation. I took
advantage of the connections of my program director, Aeveen Kerrisk, and research
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project advisor, Dr. Michael Anderson. I also reached individuals who I had heard speak
on our student visit to Stormont and a Loyalist Symposium, which I had attended earlier
in the month with my study abroad program. When choosing interviewees, I also
considered their degree of experience with the political process, amount of relevant
academic work on the subject area, or if the individual had a unique experience that made
me especially interested in their perspective.
I strived to hear a diverse range of perspectives. Of the eight people I spoke with,
three were academics with no stated affiliation. Of the remaining five interviews with
political advisors and current and former representatives, three were with unionists,
specifically DUP and UUP representatives as well as the former leader of the PUP. My
interview with Sinn Fein was the only nationalist representation. In addition, I
interviewed an advisor to the green party with no self-identified ethnic affiliation, but
from a protestant background. Thus, the nationalist perspective is slightly
underrepresented in my primary research. I did have an interview with Conall McDevitt
from the SDLP, but after moving the appointment twice, he eventually canceled the day
before I had to leave Belfast, which left me no time to find an alternate SDLP
perspective. While I would much prefer an equal representation of unionist and
nationalist parties, my interviews were never intended to be an accurate survey of party
positions. One individual cannot represent an entire party’s perspective. In addition, the
people I spoke with were often chosen for their unique experiences that would make them
poor representatives of the average politician from their party.
I chose not to use a tape recorder because I was speaking with many political
representatives and advisors that could be liable for things they say. The topic area was
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sensitive because interviewees were often evaluating or describing other parties and
politicians at Stormont. I wanted the interviewees comfortable when speaking with me,
and politicians tend to get nervous with a recording device in the room since their careers
depend on their public image. My highest priority, especially with the politicians, was an
honest conversation about the political dynamics, trends, and relationships between
parties. For the academics, a tape recorder also did not seem necessary because the
interviews were more of discussion where we could engage the ideas and theories
together to strengthen my understanding and expend my perspective. My interviews with
academics did not attempt to collect their personal experiences or stories. In place of a
tape recorder, I took notes by hand. I signified when the interviewee’s answer was in
response to one of my prewritten questions by marking it with a number that correlated to
that question. Immediately after the interview I would type up summaries of the
interviews. This allowed me to write down all of the details of the conversation and
experience while the information was still fresh in my mind.
I approached each interview as an opportunity to uncover new ideas and
perspectives from people who are deeply engaged with the political system or academic
debate that I am exploring. The interviews were an opportunity to challenge the
interviewees’ previously stated positions, to dig deeper into the debate and to hear how
individuals experience the consociational system on a day-to-day basis. I decided that a
semi-structured interview with questions tailored to each individual would be most
conducive to my approach to the interview process. The semi-structured component
enabled me to dive into interesting tangents and engage the interviewee in a conversation.
I think a conversational tone, even if I was mainly asking questions, made the interviewee

Noble 10
more open and comfortable with me. In addition, generic questions would not give me
the opportunity to have a deep conversation about the interviewees’ unique experiences
and perspectives on the consociational system. For each interviewee, I first did the
necessary research on them and their work. Then, I wrote between 12-20 questions to
guide the interview towards topics I was most interested in hearing about. There were
ultimately 8 sets of questions since the questions were tailored to each interviewee’s
unique experiences or academic work.
By the end of my research period, I had conducted eight interviews, each between
45 minutes and an hour and a half. Three interviews were with academics, two with
experience writing about consociationalism in Northern Ireland and one being an expert
on electoral systems in post-conflict states. First, I met with Dr. Peter McLoughlin who is
a lecturer at Queen’s University Belfast. He has published several books and articles
about the politics of divided societies. Most relevant to my research is his article,
“Horowitz’s theory of ethnic party competition and the case of the SDLP, 1970-79” in
the journal of Irish Political Studies. I read and analyzed this article prior to the interview
so I could engage with him on a deeper level. After the interview in his office, I sat in on
one of his graduate classes where he lectured about the past electoral trends within Irish
politics. The lecture was followed by a class discussion in which I had the opportunity to
hear the arguments and ideas of his students in relation to consociationalism and recent
electoral trends. The debate among the students, as opposed to reading or hearing one
position, allowed me to see how all of the arguments on the subject interacted.
The second lecturer from Queen’s University I interviewed is Dr. John Garry
whose research focus is on electoral behavior, public opinion and party competition in
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British and Irish politics. In preparation for this interview I read and critically analyzed
five of his articles on the topic of consociationalism including one piece that was under
review. The interviews with McLoughlin and Garry occurred around the beginning and
end of my research period respectively. The interview with McLoughlin early on in my
research made it so during future interviews I could be thinking about how the
information I was hearing from political professionals on the ground interacted with the
theoretical frameworks. The discussion with Garry at the end of my research period
helped me consolidate and crystallize the overload of information I had acquired.
The third academic interviewed was Peter Emerson, director of the De Borda
Institute, a nonprofit organization that aims to “promote the use of inclusive voting
procedures on all contentious questions of social choice”.5 In preparation, I read through
the material presented on his website as well as one of his published articles. This
interview took place at the De Borda Institute, which was not your usual office space.
The institute was located in a small cottage full of pots and pans, clothes hanging from
the ceiling and many books covering the walls. While I was originally surprised with the
setting, it proved to be a warm and welcoming environment. The interview proved very
informative and provided me insight into possible alternatives to the current system.
Of the five political professionals, there were two current political representatives,
one former representative, and two political advisors. I first met with Ross Brown, a
political advisor for the Green Party. Originally from a protestant home, Brown went to
school in London and then a Catholic school in the US. His academic journey led him to
the Green Party. The conversation with Brown was very open and honest. I do know if
5

De Borda Institiute.
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this is a product of us being closer in age, the low profile of the Green Party and thus
lower stakes involved in sharing information, or just the personality of Brown. While
little thought was put into the order of interviews due to scheduling constraints, I was
very lucky to speak with Ross Brown first. I left the interview with a much greater
understanding of party dynamics, including the relationships and conflicts that cannot be
read about in secondary sources.
Next, I interviewed MLA Sammy Douglas from the Democratic Unionist Party
and MLA John McAllister from the Ulster Unionist Party. Douglas is a former
community organizer from East Belfast. While he just entered the Northern Ireland
Assembly in May 2011, I thought he would have a unique perspective considering his
experience with economic regeneration and social justice. John McCallister was elected
in 2007 as MLA for the South Down constituency. He is also the UUP’s deputy party
leader and new whip. The interviews with Douglas, McCallister and Brown all happened
in offices in Stormont. Despite the building’s formal appearance, the conversations were
mostly casual and tended to start with conversations about my hometown and the
Washington DC area.
Finally, on my last day in Belfast, I met with former leader of the Progressive
Unionist Party, Dawn Purvis, and Elections Director for Sinn Fein, Gary Flemming.
Dawn Purvis left the PUP due to the party’s relationship with the Ulster Volunteer Force,
and then ran as an Independent Unionist. She lost her seat in the 2011 elections. At first, I
found Dawn Purvis very intimidating, but as our conversation developed, the atmosphere
became more comfortable. Gary Flemming is a long time political advisor for Sinn Fein
and most recently their Election Director. This interview also started out uncomfortable.
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It is possible Flemming felt defensive entering our conversation because my email to him
explained I was writing about the power-sharing system in Stormont. This is a sensitive
issue for many nationalists who fear a change in system would leave them powerless and
vulnerable. In conclusion, all my interviews, whether or not they started off
uncomfortable, developed into casual and interesting conversations. All of the people I
spoke with have seriously reflected on the government structure and electoral system
throughout their lives; they all had insightful perspectives.
As for topic literature, I used a variety of sources. I gathered a lot of background
and perspective on consociationalism in the book, “The Northern Ireland Conflict:
Consociational Engagements” by John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary. I then focused a
lot of my research on a core group of authors engaged in a back and forth debate about
consociationalism on a theoretical level. This group of literature included several articles
written by Arend Lijphart, McGarry and O’Leary, Paul Dixon, David Horowitz Rupert
Taylor, Seymour Lipset and published work of my own interviewees, John Gary and
Peter McLoughlin. I used these articles to put my own primary research in perspective of
the larger theoretical debate between David Horowitz and John McGarry. Next, I used
documents from the Northern Ireland Assembly, mainly the full text of the St. Andrews
Agreement, to learn how the government system was an example of consociationalism.
Finally, I read many news articles from the BBC, the Irish Times and Fort Night
magazine. My analysis focuses on the current political climate of Northern Ireland. Many
academic articles are too old to use when describing current political trends. Other times,
the articles are recently published but focus on consociationalism’s impact when it was
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first imposed. Thus, it was essential to supplement my interviews with news and
magazine sources in order to best understand the current political climate.

Resources, Challenges and Bias
While there were several minor limits on my research by nature of my
undergraduate status, the only limit that significantly impacted my research was time. My
research period was limited to a three-week stay at Stranmillis University College in
Belfast, Northern Ireland. Due to limited time, I could only conduct a small number of
interviews. Some contacts, including Naomi Long from the Alliance Party, did not have
free time during the three-week span of my stay. In addition, because it often takes a
week or two for individuals to respond to emails and finalize an agreeable time and
venue, many interviews were scheduled for my third week. With only so many hours in a
day, I could not schedule more interviews midway through the research period without
requesting very specific meeting times. Time also prevented me from reading more
secondary sources or conducting other forms of empirical research in addition to
interviews.
I discovered two main challenges in the interview process. First, it was difficult to
avoid leading questions. I would often want to know the interviewee’s perspective on a
specific issue or argument, but this required special attention to my phrasing so I was not
making claims for them and then just asking them to agree or disagree. It is a delicate
balance to try and ask pointed specific questions without making assumptions or forcing
a particular kind of answer. I improved on this throughout the interview process by
learning to ask specific and directed, but still open ended, questions.
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Second, I learned to better recognize my biases. Because the interviews were only
semi-structured, there was space for my personal bias to shape the conversation. My
colored lens could direct what kind of follow up questions I asked. My bias also affects
my research outside of interviews. The way I process and think about information is
shaped by my personal experiences. One bias I discovered is that I take a stable
government for granted because I have never known anything else. This makes me less
concerned with conflict management and more worried about the democratic procedures.
Second, my understanding of politics comes from the United States where everything is
understood along a leftwing - rightwing continuum. As a result, early on in my research I
was constantly trying to fit Northern Ireland politics into a liberal-conservative
framework or mold that does not exist in Belfast like it does in the US. Finally, my
personal liberal bias could have affected how well I connected with different people,
which could alter the direction and ease of conversation.

The Consociationalism Debate: Academic Context and Theory
Before engaging in the debate over consociationalism in Northern Ireland, it is
important to understand the academic context the debate emerges from. Group theorists
Arthur Bentley, Davis Truman and Seymour Martin Lipset argue that the leaders of social
groups with “heterogeneous and over-lapping memberships” will find it necessary to
adopt moderate positions when in competition with one another. In political terms, if
voter preference is of normal distribution on the bell curve, and there are two competing
parties, the party that can steal the most middle ground will have the most votes.6 By

6

John Garry, Personal interview (17 Nov. 2011).

Noble 16
contrast, when a society has deep cleavages and little overlapping membership between
groups, there is no pressure to become more moderate. From Aristotle to John Rawls,
political theorists have argued that moderation is key to political stability in a democratic
system.
Academics and policymakers view moderation as a key goal of post-conflict
reconstruction. As groups moderate their allegiances in relation to the ethnic conflict,
they will antagonize their counterparts less and move further from the radical ideologies
that threaten the foundation of the state. The more political moderation, the more space
for compromise between divided communities. Lipset asserts that “the chances for stable
democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of
crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations.”7 Therefore, literature evaluating postconflict government structures focuses on how the system moderates both ethnic
allegiances and issue-based agendas.
Arend Lijphart first coined the term consociationalism as he attempted to explain
how countries like Switzerland, Austria and the Netherlands managed to maintain
stability despite their divided subcultures. He credited the political elites’ highly
cooperative relationships for the countries’ stability.8 This paper adopts Lijphart’s
definition of consociationalism. He describes it as,
“pragmatically driven elite-level bargaining for a form of executive
power-sharing in which the autonomy of contending groups is

7

Seymour M. Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics (Garden City, N.Y:
Doubleday, 1960).
8
Arend Lijphart, Consociational Democracy (World Politics: a Quarterly Journal of
International Relations. 21.2 1969) 212.
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constitutionally guaranteed and protected through mutual veto rights, and
where there is a strong respect for the principles of proportionality in
elections, civil service appointments and government subsidies.” 9
Several authors, namely Paul Dixon, argue that Lijphart’s loose definition enables him to
claim all successful post-conflict states as prime models of consociationalism and
exclude all the failures. Yet because my paper only attempts to evaluate the
consociational government model in Northern Ireland, I am less concerned with a
universally applicable definition for evaluating consociationalism at large.10
Lijphart is the leading defender of consociationalism and believes it is a key
moderating force among political elites that can create a stable society from the top
down. John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, critical but loyal consociationalists, believe
the power-sharing system forces cooperation and compromise between divided parties
and is “intended to foster tolerance, mutual recognition, and respect for differences.”11
Donald Horowitz, on the other hand, criticizes the application of
concosciationalism in Northern Ireland. He argues that it does not foster moderate
politics, but instead, creates a centrifugal force moving voters toward more extreme
parties. Horowitz believes the mandatory categorization of political parties as nationalist,
unionist or other institutionalizes ethnic divides. As a result, politics cannot be the vehicle
for moderation of ethnic allegiances, social transformation and eventual integration.12 He

9

Rupert Taylor, The Belfast Agreement and the Politics of Consociationalism: a Critique
(The Political Quarterly, 2006) 218.
10
Paul Dixon, Consociationalism and the Northern Ireland Peace Process (Nationalism
and Ethnic Politics, 1997) 25-30.
11
John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary, Explaining Northern Ireland (Political Studies,
1996) 135.
12
Taylor, 217-225

Noble 18
also highlights the mutual veto power only available to ethnically affiliated parties, which
disadvantages the multi-ethnic or non-ethnic parties who take the moderate stance on
conflict-based issues.13
At the heart of his criticism, is the belief that consociationalism will not support
political moderation, but rather, destroy it. Normal politics have a centripetal pull towards
the moderate center to pick up floaters. By contrast, in the consociational system there is
little chance any voter crosses the ethnic divide so there is no incentive for parties to
move toward the middle ground. For consociationalism, the competition is within each
ethnic community and this creates a centrifugal force because of intra-ethnic outbidding.
Intra-ethnic outbidding is when parties compete for the role of the more extreme
party since any compromises with the other ethnic group is seen as a weakness that the
adversary will take advantage of.14 National-ethnic communities want a party that will be
the strongest defender of their interests and who will not sell-out to their ethnic
opponents. Horowitz sees the continuous public fear of a majoritarian institution or nonethnic or multi-ethnic parties as evidence that the conflict is still very much alive in
politics.15 Consociationalism fails to move the state forward towards peace. Instead, it reentrenches divisions and leads moderates, fearful of losing out in negotiations, to more
extreme parties.

13

Donald L. Horowitz, Explaining the Northern Ireland Agreement: the Sources of an
Unlikely Constitutional Consensus (Sage, 2002) 195.

14

Peter Mcloughlin, Horowitz's Theory of Ethnic Party Competition and the Case of the
Northern Ireland Social Democratic and Labour Party, 1970-79 (Nationalism and Ethnic
Politics, 2008) 551.
15
Horowitz, 200.
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By contrast, Lijphart is not persuaded by a plea for social transformation. He is
less concerned how the public feels about one another and more interested in seeing
political elites work together to maintain power and a stable state. In fact, Lijphart thinks
a kind of voluntary apartheid system may be the best option for a divided society. He
argues that clear boundaries dividing subcultures, both physical and metaphorical, make
it easier for the groups to co-exist.16 The less contact between groups, the less chance for
conflict. Lijphart is not concerned that consociatinoalism institutionalizes or reentrenches ethnic divisions because he thinks clear-cut divisions are actually useful to
maintaining peace.
McGarry and O’Leary, however, are more sympathetic to Horowitz’s argument.
They argue any approach that attempts to integrate, empower cross-community political
parties or even remove the peoples’ fixation on ethnic identity is desirable but
unrealistic.17 They believe consociationalism is a transitory government system and is the
best option available. Moreover, consociationalism effectively involves former radical
and violent groups in the political structure giving them a new outlet for their activism. 18
While they agree social transformation leading to a normalization of politics is ideal, they
do not believe it can be achieved any time soon, especially considering the remaining
constitutional question in Northern Ireland.

16

Lijphart, 219.
McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary, The Northern Ireland Conflict: Consociational
Engagements (Oxford University Press 2004).
18
McGarry, “Consociational Theory,” 260-61.
17
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Consociationalism in Northern Ireland
The first strand of the 2007 St. Andrews Agreement outlines the power-sharing
arrangement. The nominating officer of the largest party from the largest designation
nominates the First Minister and the nominating officer from the largest party in the
second largest designation in the Assembly nominates the Deputy First Minister.19 In
practice, this means the two largest parties within each ethnic community, currently the
Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Fein, share executive power with a mutual veto
policy.
The document states that absent consensus within the Executive on a particular
issue, the vote would be taken on a cross-community basis.20 This element of the
agreement is implemented through the petition of concern, which states that 30 MLAs
may move to require a cross-community vote on a particular motion, which requires a
majority vote from both the unionist and nationalist communities. Petition of concerns
are frequently used when legislation is controversial, related to the ethnic conflict or
otherwise significant.21
Northern Ireland uses the De Haunt electoral model, which is a form of
proportional representation designed for a divided society. This system allocates
representatives, ministerial positions of the 12 departments, and even speech time in
accordance with the “highest average”, a party’s total vote divided by a certain figure,
which increases as the party wins more seats. In the first round, the dividing figure is one,

19

Northern Ireland Assembly, Annex A, 9.
Northern Ireland Assembly, Annex A, 2.
21
Rick Wilford and Robin Wilson, A Democratic Design?: The Political Style of the
Northern Ireland Assembly (London: Constitution Unit, School of Public Policy, UCL,
2001) 49.
20
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but in subsequent rounds it is the total number of seats gained plus one. The result is a
system that largely benefits the biggest parties but leaves room for smaller parties to gain
a few seats. 22
While the definition of consociationalism is not clear-cut, the Northern Ireland
government structure is based on the core principles of a consociational government.
While consociationalism is suppose to be a transitory process, it is unrealistic Northern
Ireland changes its system for a long time because nationalists need a power-sharing
arrangement to feel secure. As a result, consociationalism needs to be able to withstand
time and its long-term impact on politics is important. An analysis of the shift in
policymaking, party platforms and electoral trends will illustrate whether this form of
government acts as a moderating force. My goal is to compare the theoretical debate to
the voices on the ground.
Horowitz’s theory is that consociationalism encourages ethnic outbidding. He
argues that within each ethnic community, parties compete to be the stronger party that
will fight the hardest for their own people in negotiations. He believes this is dangerous
because it creates a race between parties to become more extreme and cooperate less with
the other side since that may be seen as a sign of weakness.23 The problem, of course, is
that a system that creates an incentive for parties to become more extreme and
antagonistic is not healthy for a post-conflict state. On the other hand, McGarry and
O’Leary believe that the system forces cooperation and the formation of compromises
and moderate politics. I will examine whether consociationalism is a centrifugal force, as
Horowitz suggests, or if it is a moderating influence as argued by McGarry and O’Leary.
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I will explore these conflicting theories by analyzing consociationalism’s affect on
policymaking, party platforms and voter choice.

Policies and Platforms: Contesting Horowitz’s Theory
I contend Horowitz’s fear of consociationalism creating extremist, divided and
antagonistic policies and political agendas within Stormont is misplaced. There is no
outlet in Stormont for parties to engage in ethnic outbidding in terms of policymaking.
Horowitz’s centrifugal force only applies to matters related to the ethnic conflict because
those are the issues that trigger fear in people and create a defensive posture where voters
need the strongest, most extreme party to protect them in negotiations. However, matters
related to the conflict or otherwise controversial are rarely on the table. Green Party
advisor Ross Brown explained that, due to the petition of concern, basically a mutual
veto, any vote that threatens the power of either ethnic group would be immediately shut
down.24 In fact, it is not even worth the effort pursuing policies to posture for hardliners
because there is no chance such policies would make it through the system.
Lets put this argument in perspective. Imagine the DUP wanted to take votes from
the UUP by engaging in ethnic outbidding. They might consider pushing a policy for
stricter policing since their constituents have viewed the police as their protector in the
past. However, if the DUP tried to posture itself as fighting for the protestant’s issues,
Sinn Fein would look weak. As a result, Sinn Fein would immediately enact the petition
of concern to block DUP’s new policing policy. There is no room for parties to pursue
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antagonistic policies and thus, fortunately, consociationalism does not encourage
extremism in policymaking.25
As for party platforms, ethnic outbidding exists only in terms of posturing.
Because politicians cannot pass policies that benefit their ethnic group relative to the
other, their platforms have to address issues that are actually feasible to implement. MLA
for the UUP, John McCallister, explained that debates about the police service or other
conflict related issues are a throwback to the past. These days, politicians are under
pressure to talk about the bread and butter issues. He also said that politics use to be very
inward looking, but now politicians are focusing on issues that will affect the public.
Politics is moving past the original focus of just keeping Stormont afloat.26
While platforms are substantively less divisive, parties still posture when
presenting their agendas. For example, when I spoke with the Election Director of Sinn
Fein, Gary Flemming, he continued to reinforce that the party plans to reunite the north
with the Republic of Ireland. He mentioned integrating government structures even
though he must know that such an effort is, for now, politically impossible.27 Flemming’s
posturing, despite the political realities, goes to show how Horowitz’s theory of the
centrifugal force exists only on the surface, on a perceptual level. It does not have a
significant impact on parties’ political agendas. Parties may occasionally grandstand on
divisive issues to remind voters whose side they are on, but they will not be pressured to
make their platforms more extreme because there is no threat of an opposition that can
“out bid” them.
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There cannot be a more extreme alternative party within either ethnic community
because such an antagonistic party would not be able to function in Stormont. To be a
more extreme or stubborn party without rejecting the agreement would result in complete
gridlock, but at this point in the process, constituents want a functional government more
than a party that never compromises. As DUP MLA Sammy Douglas explained, the
majority of people want the system to work”.28 They want to see a party negotiate well
for their interests, which means the party has to come back to show its constituents some
benefit it effectively negotiated for. The public is not in favor of a pre-agreement world
so parties that try to outflank Sinn Fein or the DUP will find it difficult to gain traction.
Thus, despite occasional posturing, party platforms also have to become moderate and
advocate policies that are politically realistic. Horowitz’s theory of a centrifugal force
pushing parties to the edges of the political spectrum does not accurately describe the
policymaking and political agendas developing in Northern Ireland.
Despite the inapplicability of Horowitz’s theory on current policymaking and
platform setting, I agree with Peter McLoughlin that Horowitz’s theory did have a greater
impact on politics in the years following the Belfast Agreement. He explains that it was
impossible for the SDLP to compromise after the bloody events of the early 1970s. In
reaction, the SDLP fell back on its Catholic nationalist base. Because the birth of the
SDLP and their efforts to compromise coincided with the Troubles, they were forced to
abandon their compromising and peacemaking position in order to stay afloat in the
political arena.29 In addition, “in 1977 the Irish Independence Party, though weak,
challenged the SDLP causing them to ‘go more green’ which led to the departure of two
28
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founding fathers, Devlin and Fitt.30 The incentive to be the stronger party in terms of
defending your ethnic group’s interests played a much larger role during the emergence
of the consociational system.
This discrepancy can be explained by the unique political context. At that time,
people did not fully believe a functional government was more important than how
sectarian issues were resolved. Therefore, there was space for groups to steal the
hardliners’ support by opposing the agreement. Yet, since then, Sinn Fein and the DUP
have effectively moved inwards towards the middle while maintaining in step with their
base. Over time, they have constantly pushed inwards but are always careful not to
become too moderate, too fast and risk losing their hardliner base.

Policies and Platforms: Moderation Through Intra-Group Competition
The moderating influence of consociationalism on policies and political agendas
is significant. This movement towards the middle ground is caused by intra-group
competition. To gain more votes within their ethnic communities, parties must move
towards the middle.31 Academic from Queen’s University, Peter McLoughlin, explains
that Sinn Fein has become increasingly moderate and adopted the SDLP’s original
platform, thus effectively co-opting many of their supporters. He sees a parallel trend in
the unionist community. The DUP, a party that originally refused to sit in the same room
as Sinn Fein, is now very cooperative in committees and at the ministerial level. In a
sense, they too, have taken the UUP’s original peace making status.32
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In addition, Sinn Fein, known for its leftist politics, is increasingly conservative,
while the conservative DUP is increasingly liberal. Both parties are moving towards the
center. Brown stated that Sinn Fein’s economic policies are increasingly more
conservative.33 Brown also mentioned the SDLP, originally leftwing, was moving
towards the right and pointed to the growth of conservative Catholics in the party.34
Douglas agreed with Brown’s take on Sinn Fein economic policies. Douglas thinks Sinn
Fein is becoming more conservative while the DUP becomes more liberal. He explained
that the DUP was less church oriented and moving towards the center. He went on to say,
“Peter Robinson and I want to go back to the DUP’s roots with the lower class”.35 Later
that day, McCallister told me his party, the UUP, was the real centrist party. As support,
he referenced David Cameron legislating for gay marriage in Britain. I inferred the UUP
support David Cameron because of the context of McCallister’s reference to him when
describing the UUP’s increasingly moderate political stance. McCallister also agreed that
the DUP was becoming increasingly moderate on the political spectrum. He said the DUP
was moving inward and claiming the UUP platform. Young people are not embarrassed
to vote for them anymore and Peter Robinson is moving towards the center ground.
McCallister continued to explain it was “getting crowded in the center” and that there’s
been moderation both in terms of sectarianism and left verse right wing politics.36 All
parties are competing within their ethnic block to be moderate and collect the most votes.
Consociationalism creates intra-block competition, which can have a moderating effect.
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In conclusion, I found that there was no meaningful centrifugal force in terms of
policymaking and party platforms. Instead, there is a significant shift towards more
moderate politics. While it is encouraging to see more moderate policies and
compromising among political leadership, it is also important voters’ political views are
increasingly moderate and less antagonistic.

Voter Choice: The Prisoner’s Dilemma of Consociationalism
Consociationalism has less of a moderating influence on voter choice. Voter
choice is not necessarily controlled by policy making and platforms. People can vote for
a candidate based on characteristics that do not affect their actual polity. For example,
they could vote based off the candidate’s appearance, personal character, family
background, or in this case, ethnicity and religion. Moreover, you can vote for a
candidate as a symbolic gesture to support the causes they stand for, even if you know
they cannot realistically legislate on behalf of those causes. Through my discussions with
political representatives, it seems that voter choice can still be explained by Horowitz’s
theory that consociationalism acts as a centrifugal force.
Voters choose which party to vote for based on who they think will best protect
their interests in negotiations. They tend to make this decision based on which party is
perceptually more aggressive and stronger in defending the interests of their ethnic group.
Voters view politics as a zero-sum game, whether or not it actually is, explained Dawn
Purvis, former leader of the Progressive Unionist Party. She explained that most people
want to vote for the aggressive party and because of the way history played out, those
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parties are Sinn Fein and the DUP. Flemming, when explaining the growth of Sinn Fein,
said “the negotiating strength of Sinn Fein actively captured people’s imagination”. 37
Brown explained the phenomenon as a classic prisoner’s dilemma. Ideally, both
parties vote for the cooperative party and then the two most cooperative parties can
govern most effectively. However, if one party votes for the cooperative party and the
other votes for the more extreme one, voters feel the cooperative party would be taken
advantage of and their ethnic group would lose power and be in danger. Therefore, voters
tend to vote for the most extreme party that they think will fight the hardest and not sell
out their constituents in negotiations. This creates an unfortunate scenario where the two
most extreme or antagonistic parties are in office together.38 In the case of Northern
Ireland, we know the voters’ decision to put in power the two most extreme parties does
not cause much damage because the system forces them to cooperate. However, the
prisoner’s dilemma is still perceived to be true. Voters still believe they are in danger
unless they vote the extreme party in power. Thus, voter choice is affected by Horowitz’s
theory of ethic outbidding even if it does not affect actual policy.
As a result, parties must put on a performance. It is important for parties, mainly
Sinn Fein and the DUP, to be perceived as hardliners, even if they cannot actually act as
hardliners because of the structure of consociationalism. Brown believes Sinn Fein and
the DUP are very conscious of this. He said that when the cameras are on in the chambers
the DUP and Sinn Fein throw around insults and act aggressive. When the cameras are
off, however, and they are working side by side in committees, they tend to get along
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quite well.39 Hard-line unionist Jim Allister agreed with this sentiment when he recently
said “When you get up close to them at Stormont it still amazes me how those who once
pledged to smash Sinn Féin are today their buddies.”40 It is in both the interest of Sinn
Fein and the DUP to be perceived as antagonistic and at each other’s throats because it is
that kind of posturing that keeps Catholics and Protestants too scared to vote for a more
compromising party.
Of course, to claim all constituents cast their votes just to preserve their ethnic
group’s relative power is an over simplification and inaccurate, but the political leaders
and academics I spoke with did believe the prisoner’s dilemma mentality plays a major
role in elections. Thus, when determining if consociationalism has had a moderating
influence on Northern Ireland politics, the answer is messy. There is a legacy of
Horowitz’s model that continues to affect voter choice, but at the same time the parties
are moving inward and adopting more moderate policies and platforms. Thus, in the
words of McLoughlin, “the parties that seem extreme are really quite moderate”.41

Policies and Platforms: Moderate or Meaningless?
Because voter choice is often determined by the perception of a party’s allegiance
to their ethnic community and not their actual policies, a problem with consociationalism
arises. As seen above, Sinn Fein and the DUP can rely on a large sum of votes just by
nature of their reputations as the defenders of nationalist and unionist interests. This gives
them the freedom to become more moderate, but also to stand on loose, undefined
39
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shifting platforms. Each party has a strong base of loyal hardliners so they dedicate their
efforts to attracting the floating voters, those without strong allegiances who may shift to
Sinn Fein from other parties. The hardliner bases are so loyal that parties are able to
become overly inclusive and claim to serve other groups with radically different interests.
The disconnect between voter choice and actual governance within Stormont allows
parties to grandstand on loose, undefined and shifting platforms which stifles the
democratic process.
There is a difference between increasingly moderate agendas and undefined
shifting agendas. Moderate politics does not mean the party chooses to stand for nothing.
As parties and platforms have become more moderate, they may have also become less
defined and too broad. After speaking with political figures, it is unclear what each party
stands for outside of unattainable nationalist and unionist agendas. Parties are voting on
normal issues including budgets, education, corporate tax, etc, but there is not an
ideology directing their decisions or a consistent application of principles.
Political representatives and advisors recognize the fluidity of their political
agendas. Purvis explained how the DUP had both upper-class unionists and very low
class loyalists. The DUP is able to sell their platform to two groups whose interests
should diverge in terms of taxes and government funded support programs. Purvis also
explained that the DUP often tries to be economically conservative and socially liberal,
which she does not think makes sense since interventionist economic policies are needed
to support social programs.42 The fact that Ian Paisley and Peter Robinson, two people
with radically different agendas, are major players in the same party is evidence of the
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shifting and undefined position of the DUP. The Alliance Party’s platform is also vague.
The most clear concrete component about their political agenda, according to Brown, is
that they are not nationalist or unionist.43
Douglas was quick to admit that “the DUP was becoming a broad church” that is
content with both rightwing conservatives and leftwing liberals.44 He went on to describe
the UUP as a party of independents because they disagree with each other in committees
and are not always unified during committee votes. When I asked Douglas and his intern,
Phill Brett, the difference between the DUP and the UUP, there was a short pause. Bret
explained the two groups had a different way of selling the same message and Douglas
referred to the UUP as a more middle class party looking to score political points. They
did not mention any differences related to the two parties’ positions on actual issues.45 It
seems like the DUP and UUP have a loose and shifting political agenda that can be
tailored to attract different groups. In fact, I predict that the DUP platform was described
in a different light when Peter Robinson recruited Sammy Douglas to run for election as a
member of the DUP.
When I met with Sammy Douglas from the DUP, I became very confused as to
what kind of party the DUP was. My readings on Northern Ireland politics had described
the DUP as a very conservative party, but Douglas immediately told me he was a member
of the Old Labor Party in Britain that is notorious for its very liberal agenda. He went on
to explain how he wanted welfare programs for the communist most difficult to reach and
policies to help with employment rates. This agenda was not consistent with the DUP’s
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stated conservative economy platform. He went on to accuse the UUP of being too
conservative when they are normally thought to be a more centrist party. 46 During my
interview with Purvis, I asked her about Sammy Douglas’ and the DUP’s political
ideology. Purvis smiled slightly and said that Sammy is confused. She told me she tried
to explain to him that he could not hold on to his socialist roots now that he is a member
of such a conservative right wing party. While I found the DUP’s political agenda to be
riddled with contradictions and overly broad, Sinn Fein was also worrisome.
Sinn Fein’s platform is equally undefined outside of its aspirations for a united
Ireland. Flemming explained that it was very difficult to balance the interests of hardliner
supporters and more moderate members without sending two different messages. Brown
stated that Sinn Fein voted for one of the most conservative budgets of all time. He
believes Sinn Fein’s stated economic philosophy is not apparent in their actual
decisions.47 Purvis told me Deputy Minister, Martin McGinnis, once said there was no a
cigarette paper between him and DUP First Minister, Peter Robinson, on economic
issues.48 Sinn Fein becoming more conservative in their economic policies is just a party
becoming more moderate, but Sinn Fein continuing to grandstand on a socialist economic
agenda to sections of their constituents and then voting for a conservative budget is more
troubling.
Voters, on balance, are not making their decisions based on policy issues, so
parties can get away with a loose undefined platform. Voters giving parties the freedom
to have undefined and inconsistent political agendas poses a serious threat to democracy.
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If voters feel required to cast votes to protect their ethnic party, regardless of the
substantive issues, they are in a sense disenfranchised. If consociationalism wants to live
up to its democratic ideals, it needs to encourage voting based on substantive issues.

A Potential Solution: The De Borda Electoral System
Director of the De Borda Institute, Peter Emerson, studies different types of
electoral systems in post-conflict states. He grew up with one British parent and one Irish
parent. Frustrated with the categorization of people and divisions within society, he began
to study conflict resolution in many areas including the Balkans. He takes a strong stance
against majoritarianism and referendums because he believes they over limit the people’s
choices. While he thinks the De Haunt method paired with the consociational system is
preferable to a purely majoritarian system, he believes the political climate would
improve if Northern Ireland adopted the De Borda electoral system.49 There should be
opportunities for smaller factions within ethnic divides to grow, as well as crosscommunity parties. There needs to be space for parties to gain votes because of their
stance on labor rights or economic freedom, not just the strength of their ethnic
allegiance.50
The De Borda system has voters rank the options or candidates from first
preference onwards. Voters can choose to rank only one candidate, but their votes will be
worth more, the more candidates they rank. This voting system was illustrated in 1986,
eight years before the ceasefire, when Emerson held a meeting with representatives from
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every major political party except the DUP. The 200 person meeting began with a
moment of silence; it was a major moment to have all the different political groups in one
room. Next, there was a large discussion in which anyone could suggest a solution to the
constitutional question that was tearing apart Northern Ireland. The only caveat was that
the suggestion could not violate the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which meant a
party could not offer the solution of killing all the Protestants or Catholics. At the end of
the discussion, there were ten options on the ballot. Through the discussion, people had
brainstormed eight options beyond being part of Britain or being part of the Republic.
Each individual in the room was then asked to rank the options one through ten. They
could choose to rank only one option, but then their vote would only give that option one
point. On the other hand, if they ranked all ten, their first choice would get ten points,
second choice nine points etc. The system created an incentive for people to consider
other ideas and express their opinions on them.51
If Northern Ireland used this system, it would increase cross-community dialogue
and expand that factors that influence voter choice. In Emerson’s experiment, it is in the
interest of each group to persuade others to rank their option 5th instead of 8th because
that could actually affect the election. In the case of Northern Ireland politics this means
parties cannot rely on an easy win because of their hardliner base. Even if Sinn Fein gets
all the hardliner votes, the SDLP could still gain seats if both nationalists and unionists
ranked it a high second. Moreover, it provides an opportunity for smaller parties to gain
influence because people can give them votes without abandoning their first preference.
Most importantly, voters would have to consider who to give their second or third
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preferences to if they wanted their vote to be weighted for their first preference. This
would force them to break through the mentality that politics is a zero-sum game and
encourage them to think about more diverse reasons to vote for a candidate or party. If
voters are looking at real policy issues, then parties will be forced to create a stable
platform to retain votes, thus reinforcing democratic values within the consociational
system. Consociationalism could continue to be a moderating influence on policymakinf
and political platforms, but voter choice would become more substantive preventing
parties from grandstanding on overly broad and shifting political agendas.
There are other suggestions that have been made as well. Including abolishing the
distinction between First and Deputy First Minister so that voters, especially unionists,
are not controlled by the fear that they will lose their position as First Minister and
therefore never vote outside of the DUP. This seems like an easy change to make to the
system since the two positions hold the exact same powers. Other ideas include
increasing the role of non-aligned ‘other’ parties by allowing their votes to count for
cross-community support when there’s a petition of concern. Some people have talked
about restructuring the government so there can be an opposition, increasing the options
for voters. At minimum, the government should commission an independent review of
the electoral system and be discussing ways it could be improved.52

Conclusion
I set out to analyze whether consociationalism, both in terms of the electoral
system and government structure, had a moderating influence on Northern Ireland
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politics. I planned to see if Horowitz’s theory of a centrifugal force accurately describes
Northern Ireland politics or if McGarry and O’Leary’s theory prevailed and
consociationalism created a centripetal force, pushing parties towards the moderate
middle ground. Through interviews and topic literature, I concluded consociationalism
does have a moderating influence on policies and platforms. Both on sectarian issues and
on the liberal – conservative divide, political parties are enacting more moderate policies
and adopting increasingly moderate political agendas. With the exception of the
occasional posturing for hardliners, there is no opportunity for extreme, antagonist or
conflict-related politics within Stormont.
However, Horowitz’s theory does continue to explain voter choice. Voters still
want to vote for the party they perceive to be more extreme, even if the party is
increasingly moderate in actuality. Voters are still swayed by the purely perceptual
posturing of politicians and believe they must vote for the most antagonistic of the parties
because a compromising party would be taken advantage of giving too much power to the
other side. Because voters constantly give their support to the seemingly hardliner parties,
Sinn Fein and the DUP, these parties are not held accountable to a consistent political
agenda outside of “being nationalist” or “being unionist”. As a result, parties have vague
and undefined platforms that shift depending on whose votes they are trying to attract at
the time. A potential solution to this threat to democratic values is the De Borda Electoral
system, a form of consensus voting that encourages voters to consider issues unrelated to
ethnic allegiances.
My argument was formed through the stories and idea of the people I spoke with.
If I had the time to speak with 30 or more even if I had just spoke with eight different

Noble 37
people, my conclusions could easily be different. My research is not a conclusive claim
about consociationalism in Northern Ireland or the academic theories surrounding it.
Rather, my argument is an attempt to consolidate the opinions and information I was told
into a cohesive report of consociationalism’s impact on Northern Ireland politics. Future
researcher should test the opinions and hypothesis I heard from my interviewees through
rigorous empirical research. The could also focus on whether the moderating influence of
consociationalism is different on conflict related issues compared to general bread and
butter issues.
Through this project I gained an overwhelming admiration and respect for the
people I spoke with and the efforts of the many individuals in Northern Ireland that have
brought the state this far along in only a few years. In the midst of studying electoral
trends and analyzing ivory tower academic theories, it is easy to forget about the darkness
these political complexities emerge from. As academics analyze the behavior of voters
and politicians in post-conflict states, it is important to remember many of these
individuals went through unimaginable traumas. Many of the people I spoke with
experienced, in one way or another, the violent conflict that plagued Northern Ireland for
30 years. When you put Northern Ireland’s political climate in perspective, both sides of
the conflict have come so far. Politicians, despite all emotional stress, sit down with the
other side. Voters express their perspectives through a ballot box instead of violence.
Consociationalism has brought stabilization and done its best to give people a voice.
While there is room for improvement, the people of Northern Ireland have moved the
country in a better, more peaceful direction.
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Appendix A.
Glossary of Terms
Consociationalism: A form of government often used in post-conflict states. It is
pragmatically driven by elite-level bargaining in the form of executive power-sharing in
which the autonomy of contending groups is constitutionally guaranteed and protected
through mutual veto rights, and where there is a strong respect for the principles of
proportionality in elections, civil service appointments and government subsidies.53
Centrifugal Force: The increasing divisions within politics as parties move farther from
center moderate ground and adopt more extremist, radical or even antagonistic agendas.
Centripetal Force: A unified force that brings people together towards the middle ground.
It describes the trend of political parties becoming moderate and moving inward.
Ethnic Outbidding: Outbidding occurs when parties compete for a position toward the
end point of a spectrum. In the case of ethnic outbidding, that spectrum measures a
party’s ethnic allegiance. Thus, ethnic outbidding is when parties compete to be most
aligned with and most dedicated to working for the interests of a particular ethnic group.
Intra-Ethnic Competition: Political competition within respective ethnic communities. In
the case of Northern Ireland, two nationalist parties like Sinn Fein and the SDLP in
competition for votes would be an example of intra-ethnic competition.
Posturing: To adopt an attitude or position for politically strategic purposes.
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